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Getting More Organs for Transplantation
Abstract
Organs for transplantation are a scarce resource. Paying to increase the supply of organs is illegal in much of
the world. We review efforts to increase transplantation by increasing the supply of available organs from
living and deceased donors. Progress has been made in increasing the availability of living donor kidneys
through kidney exchange. Recent legislation in Israel aims at encouraging deceased donation by awarding
priority for receiving organs to registered donors. We also explore the manner in which organ donation is
solicited and present evidence to suggest that some recent movement towards "mandated choice" may be
counterproductive.
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The United States and most other nations suf-
fer from a shortage of human organs for trans-
plant. In the United States, over 120,000 people 
are on waiting lists for organ transplant and 
every year over 10,000 people die while wait-
ing (Organ Procurement and Transplantation 
Network). There are a number of fronts on 
which research has made progress to address 
this shortage, but there is still significant work to 
be done. We describe how organs are acquired 
and allocated, strategies that have been imple-
mented to increase the number or organ dona-
tions for transplantation from living donors, and 
work we are conducting to understand how we 
can recover more organs from deceased donors. 
For example, how organs are allocated can mod-
erate their scarcity, not just through efficiencies 
in allocation but also through changes in donor 
behavior. We will describe a market design being 
explored in Israel to increase organ donor regis-
tration by providing priority on organ waiting 
lists for individuals who previously registered 
as organ donors. We will also report results that 
raise concern over policies that have recently 
been implemented in the United Kingdom and 
several US states, namely changing the way the 
organ registration question is asked to a “man-
dated choice” frame.
Organs for transplant can be recovered from 
living donors and deceased donors. Living 
donors give an organ while alive. Living dona-
tion of kidneys, which represented 96 per-
cent of all US living organ donations in 2012 
(OPTN), is possible since humans have two kid-
neys but can live a healthy life with only one, 
allowing the other to be removed and donated. 
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The vast majority of these living donors make 
directed donations: they donate the organ to a 
 prespecified recipient, usually a family mem-
ber. There are relatively rare instances of nondi-
rected donation, where an individual donates to 
whoever needs an organ; just over 3 percent of 
living donor kidneys in the United States came 
from nondirected donors in 2012 (Cook and 
Krawiec 2013).
Deceased donors are individuals whose organs 
are donated at the time of their death. The major-
ity of organ donors are deceased donors (58 per-
cent in 2012 when there were 8,143 deceased 
donors and 5,867 living donors, per OPTN). In 
addition, since each deceased donor can donate 
multiple organs, the large majority of organs are 
recovered from deceased donors (81 percent of 
all organs for transplant in 2012, per OPTN). 
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act requires con-
sent for deceased donation, either by the indi-
vidual having previously registered as an organ 
donor or by the deceased’s next of kin. Organ 
donor registration usually takes place at state 
departments of motor vehicles, and despite the 
relative ease of becoming an organ donor—usu-
ally just checking a box or signing a form—only 
43 percent of Americans are registered (Donate 
Life America 2012). Many additional organs 
are recovered when next of kin consent to dona-
tion on behalf of unregistered deceased. (Next 
of kin are also asked to consent to donation of 
registered donors. While this confirmation is not 
deemed to be legally necessary to proceed with 
donation, it is usually done anyway; see Glazier 
2011). That next of kin play an important role 
means that registration and transplantation are 
not identical, which is going to be important 
when we discuss priorities for registration and 
mandated choice.
Organs that are made available for transplant 
save lives and lower medical costs. For organs 
like the liver and the heart, patients who do not 
receive an organ for transplant when they need 
one often have short life expectancy. Individuals 
with kidney failure can survive for a number of 
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years on dialysis, but they live ten years lon-
ger on average if they receive an organ from a 
deceased donor (Wolfe et al. 1999). Receiving 
a  living donor kidney likely generates additional 
life years since the average living donor kidney 
lasts substantially longer than a deceased donor 
kidney. In addition, dialysis costs Medicare 
about $90,000 a year, while transplantation costs 
$100,000 for the surgery plus $20,000 a year for 
immunosuppressive drugs (i.e., an out of pocket 
savings of $250,000 per transplant over the first 
five years; see Rees et al. 2012).
With such significant gains coming from 
organ donation and transplantation, the excess 
demand for organs is an important policy prob-
lem. One standard first response by economists 
is that we can solve excess demand by raising 
the price from the current legal limit of zero by 
allowing organs to be bought and sold, poten-
tially for both living and deceased donation (see, 
e.g., Becker and Elias 2007). However this is not 
easy to implement, since many countries have 
strict legislation against such transactions (in the 
United States it is a felony under the National 
Organ Transplant Act of 1984). Roth (2007) 
uses the term “repugnant transaction” to denote 
a transaction that some people would like to 
engage in but which others think should not be 
allowed and shows that repugnant transactions 
have a long and varied history that changes in 
time and place (e.g., charging interest on loans, 
indentured servitude, selling horsemeat for 
human consumption, and same-sex marriage all 
have been repugnant transactions in some times 
and places and not in others). Kidney sales are 
often the leading example of a repugnant transac-
tion cited by those who would put stricter limits 
on markets in general (e.g., Sandel 2012, 2013), 
because of their sense that such sales arouse 
widespread opposition. A representative sample 
survey of Americans conducted by Leider and 
Roth (2010) suggests that disapproval of kidney 
sales correlates with other socially conservative 
attitudes, but that it does not rise to the level of 
disapproval of other repugnant transactions such 
as prostitution. In addition, there is evidence that 
the manner of the payment to an organ donor 
may mitigate some of the repugnance concerns. 
Niederle and Roth (forthcoming) find that pay-
ments to nondirected kidney donors are deemed 
more acceptable when they arise as a reward for 
heroism and public service than when they are 
viewed as a payment for kidneys.
The particular interest in donations from 
nondirected donors arises because of the large 
effect they have on facilitating other live-donor 
transplants, through the mechanism of kidney 
exchange, which arose in the last decade as an 
effective means of promoting transplantation 
even when donors and their intended recipi-
ents are biologically incompatible (see Roth, 
SÖnmez, and Ünver 2004, 2005 for early pro-
posals that have led to large-scale implementa-
tion). As kidney exchange began to assemble 
pools of patient-donor pairs, it became possible 
to offer nondirected donors the possibility of ini-
tiating a long chain of donations, in which the 
nondirected donor would donate to the patient 
in an incompatible pair, whose donor would 
donate to another pair, and so on (see, e.g., Roth 
et al. 2006 for the suggestion that such chains 
could be made long by being nonsimultane-
ous, and Rees et al. 2009 for the report of the 
first nonsimultaneous chain, which at the time 
of the report facilitated ten transplants, and sub-
sequently grew to 16). In total there have been 
over 2,500 paired donation kidney transplants 
performed in the United States since the year 
2000, when the first two transplants of that kind 
were performed. Not only do long chains make 
more efficient use of the otherwise unavailable 
kidneys from willing donors who are incompat-
ible with their intended recipients, it appears 
that the possibility of initiating a long chain 
and facilitating multiple transplants may inspire 
additional nondirected donors.
While kidney exchange has increased the 
number of living donor transplants, the waiting 
list for transplants continues to grow, highlight-
ing the need to explore other avenues—such as, 
strategies to increase the number of deceased 
donor organs available for transplant. As for 
living organ donation, legislation in the United 
States and most other nations prohibits the use 
of monetary payments as an inducement for 
deceased organ donation. Consequently, one 
promising approach has been to create non-
monetary incentives for deceased donation. 
Singapore and, more recently, Israel have intro-
duced allocation schemes that provide prior-
ity on organ donor waiting lists to individuals 
who have previously registered as donors. Since 
organ donor waiting lists can often be quite long 
(e.g., the average wait time on the list for a kid-
ney in the United States is over four years, per 
OPTN) and receiving an organ for transplant 
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sooner is  usually preferable to the alternative 
(e.g., remaining on dialysis), receiving priority 
on a waiting list if an individual ever needs an 
organ can be an actionable incentive to register.
Whether such policies are effective at gen-
erating new donors will require an analysis of 
empirical data. Early indications of success are 
promising (Lavee et al. 2013), but it will take 
time for individuals to decide whether to regis-
ter and to see whether the increase in registra-
tion leads to the desired increase in organs for 
transplant (a gap between these may arise for 
reasons we will address below). In the mean-
time, we can use laboratory experiments to bet-
ter understand the priority architecture that has 
been implemented in Israel and how it might be 
implemented in other countries.
Our first project on priority allocation investi-
gated whether such a rule would increase regis-
tration and the mechanisms that might generate 
an effect (Kessler and Roth 2012). We designed 
a laboratory game modeled on the decision to 
register as an organ donor, in which subjects 
could pay a monetary cost (meant to model the 
psychic cost of registering as an organ donor) 
that would allow their assets (meant to model 
kidneys) to be donated to other subjects in the 
lab who needed them to earn money once the 
assets were no longer of use to the donor (meant 
to model deceased donation). We compared 
treatments where allocation of available assets 
was made on a first-come, first-served basis 
(meant to model the current US allocation sys-
tem) to a treatment where those who agreed to 
pay the cost to donate their assets received prior-
ity for any donated assets that became available. 
The priority allocation rule led to a large, sig-
nificant increase in donation. Additional treat-
ments revealed that the main mechanism driving 
this increase was the monetary incentive effect 
of priority;  the same increase in donation was 
induced by providing a rebate for donation equal 
to the expected value of having priority or by 
lowering the cost of donation by the expected 
value of having priority.
While our first experiment investigated the 
reasons priority might work to increase organ 
donations, it made a simplifying assumption that 
we investigated in follow-up work. Namely, it 
assumed that the allocation rule could be imple-
mented so that everyone who registered as an 
organ donor to receive priority would actually 
donate when in a position to do so. However, the 
implementation of the priority rule in Israel sug-
gests this assumption may not hold true. The 
Israeli donor registration card, which one must 
sign to receive priority, has a check box that 
requires a clergyman chosen by the deceased’s 
family to approve the donation at the time of 
death. This check box has the potential to oper-
ate as a loophole in the priority allocation sys-
tem whereby an individual signs a donor card to 
receive priority on the waiting list if he is ever 
in need of an organ but expects his family or 
clergyman to decline the donation if he dies and 
is in a position to donate. Essentially it allows 
individuals to receive priority even though they 
would never make a donation.
In a second laboratory study, we investigate 
how such a loophole might affect the ability of 
the priority system to increase donation as well 
as registration (Kessler and Roth, forthcom-
ing). First, we replicate the effect of the priority 
rule we identified in our previous work (despite 
changing the parameters of the laboratory 
study in a number of ways). When registration 
leads automatically to donation, we again find 
that giving priority to individuals who register 
increases the number of organs made available 
for transplant. However, when we introduce a 
loophole in the priority system—allowing sub-
jects to register for priority but not pay the cost 
of donation and so never donate—we find that 
the loophole completely eliminates the benefit 
of priority. Those subjects who might have been 
induced to donate by the incentive of receiv-
ing priority simply take priority without paying 
the cost of donation. Across all subjects in all 
rounds, 96 percent have priority when the loop-
hole is available.
We also find that introducing a loophole to a 
priority allocation system might do additional 
harm. In a set of treatments where we provide 
subjects with information about the costs and 
decisions of others (i.e., the distribution of 
costs of donation and distributions of choices to 
donate or to take the loophole in the previous 
round) we get fewer donations under a priority 
system with a loophole than under a first-come, 
first-served system without priority. This means 
that subjects who would have donated for altru-
istic or warm glow reasons (Andreoni 1990) 
choose not to donate when a loophole is avail-
able. Investigating into the round-by-round data, 
we find that this effect appears to be driven by 
a conditional cooperation motive. Subjects are 
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less likely to donate when they learn that oth-
ers are choosing not to pay the cost of dona-
tion. However, subjects treat taking the loophole 
as a worse affront than simply not donating, 
 presumably since those who take the loophole 
are explicitly abusing a system designed to 
reward donors. Consequently, subjects withhold 
donation more in response to observing others 
use the loophole than in response to observ-
ing others choose not to donate. Only time will 
tell whether Israelis who do not want to donate 
will take advantage of the clergy check box as 
a loophole or how individuals might respond to 
such an abuse. In the meantime, our results high-
light that the way priority is implemented mat-
ters a great deal for the success of such market 
designs.
While priority on organ donor waiting lists 
for registered donors might be possible to imple-
ment in the United States, policy attention in 
recent years has focused instead on how indi-
viduals are asked to register as organ donors. US 
states and many other countries maintain an opt-
in registry whereby individuals are by default 
not organ donors but can choose to join the 
registry. An alternative, implemented by many 
European countries, presumes consent and 
gives individuals the opportunity to opt out of 
the organ donor registry. Johnson and Goldstein 
(2003, 2004) show that European countries that 
have opt-out systems have vastly higher donor 
registration rates than the European countries 
that have opt-in systems. The same authors find 
that in hypothetical choice data subjects indi-
cate they would be more likely to remain on an 
organ donor registry in an opt-out system than 
to join an organ donor registry in an opt-in sys-
tem. However, switching to an opt-out system 
has been deemed untenable in the United States 
since organ donation falls under gift law and so 
requires a positive statement of support in favor 
of donation (Glazier 2011). In addition, despite 
the higher rates of organ donor designation in 
the European countries that presume consent, 
only Spain has a higher per capita organ recov-
ery rate than the US. While Spain presumes con-
sent, there is an indication that its high recovery 
rate is due to a more efficient organization of 
transplant services (Deffains and Ythier 2010).
Instead of moving to presumed consent, 
therefore, the predominant policy change in 
the United States has been to switch the organ 
donation registration question from an opt-in 
frame to a “mandated choice” frame (also called 
a “forced choice” or an “active choice” frame). 
Under an opt-in frame, the individual who is 
being asked to register, usually at a state depart-
ment of motor vehicles, checks a box to register 
and leaves it blank not to register. Under a man-
dated choice frame, the organ donation request 
is framed as a “yes” or “no” question whereby 
answering yes adds the individual to the registry 
and answering no does not. This policy change 
has been recently implemented by a number of 
US states (e.g., Illinois, California, New York) 
as well as by the United Kingdom.
While this switch to mandated choice has been 
pushed by organ donor advocates, the support for 
the policy comes from hypothetical choice data 
in which individuals were more likely to report 
being willing to join a registry when asked under 
a mandated choice with no prior default than 
when asked under an opt-in frame when individ-
uals were presumed to not be donors (Johnson 
and Goldstein 2003, 2004). Additional results 
have come from the use of mandated choice in 
Illinois (Thaler 2009), which was implemented 
among other changes including simplifying the 
registration process and making organ donor reg-
istration legally binding.
In ongoing work, we are investigating whether 
the effect of framing the organ donor registra-
tion question as a mandated choice increases 
registration rates over an opt-in frame where 
individuals check a box to register and leave it 
blank not to register. Results from an experi-
mental study of actual organ donor decisions 
on the Massachusetts Organ and Tissue Donor 
Registry suggest that the mandated choice frame 
may not deliver an increase in registrations as 
promised (Kessler and Roth 2013).
In addition, we find that mandated choice may 
have a negative effect on organ donation, even if 
it leaves organ donor registration unchanged. As 
discussed above, registrations are not the only 
way organs can become available for transplant; 
the organs of an unregistered deceased can be 
donated by surviving next of kin. In a hypotheti-
cal choice experiment we ask subjects to report 
whether they think next of kin should donate a 
deceased’s organs. We show subjects the deci-
sion screen the deceased saw (either a mandated 
choice frame or an opt in frame) and indicate 
the choice made by the deceased (either to join 
the registry or not to join the registry). Subjects 
are less likely to report that next of kin should 
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donate the organs of an unregistered deceased if 
the deceased explicitly said no to registration in 
a mandated choice framed question than if the 
deceased simply chose not to opt in. This sug-
gests that asking individuals to register under a 
mandated choice frame may make it harder to 
get permission for organ donation from the next 
of kin of those who remain unregistered. This 
is particularly important because the historical 
data in Massachusetts suggests that over half of 
the unregistered donors have their organs recov-
ered after next of kin gives permission.
Kessler and Roth (2013) do find that provid-
ing a simple and convenient way for donors to 
change their organ donation status on the reg-
istry increases deceased donor registration, and 
so expanding the opportunities to do so under 
the current opt-in framework seems worth fur-
ther exploration. However, note that while we 
see great potential in increasing the number of 
deceased donor organs available for transplant, 
there is a limit to the number of organs that 
can be recovered from this source alone. Since 
individuals need to die in a manner conducive 
to organ donation (e.g., die in a hospital, typi-
cally from an intracranial event) for the organs 
to be suitable for transplant, there is a bound on 
the number of potential donors. Estimates from 
2010 suggest that organs are recovered from just 
over two thirds of eligible deaths, meaning there 
would have been fewer than 3,000 additional 
donors if consent for donation were received for 
all eligible deaths (Cook and Krawiec 2013). 
While these potential donors could save thou-
sands of additional lives, at current rates of 
medical need, these donors alone would not be 
able to supply all the demand. Consequently, we 
must continue working on numerous fronts to 
solve this growing problem.
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